In my view, what is happening is that Russia is losing.
Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine was a crime, but it was also a mistake. It is hard for any government to admit such a thing (one still awaits a judgment on America’s Iraq War debacle). But it is particularly hard for a tyrant whose power rests on his image as a strong man with infallible judgment.
Russia has reached the stage in the war in which it is fighting because not fighting would be embarrassing. It has reached this stage quickly.
Read also: Putin is preparing for a new war
The war only ends when Putin realizes that Russia is losing it, in the precise sense that he realizes that his personal position is threatened. In other words, it is not a direct translation from territory held or lost, or from casualties taken or inflicted, but a political conjuncture that is hard to seize precisely.
Most likely, Russian defeat looks like Ukrainian battlefield momentum that changes the mood in Russia and creates visible tension within the Russian state, thereby forcing Putin to change his story. Is that possible?
It is certainly possible for Putin to change his story. He does that all the time. Indeed, it is how he rules. He changed his story the last time he invaded Ukraine and failed to meet his objectives. The shift from “the invasion of Ukraine is impossible” to “the invasion of Ukraine is inevitable” this February took place with Orwellian élan. He could reverse the narrative again (so long as things don’t get too far out of control). But he won’t change his story until he has to, and only Ukrainian progress will force him to do so.
Is it possible for the Ukrainians to gain the necessary momentum on the battlefield? I think that this is likely, but first I want to acknowledge something very basic. Wars are predictably unpredictable. They take place over time and on terrain, on bodies and in minds, in realms not easily captured in maps or in textbooks — and some unexpected development can intrude from some odd angle and change everything.
Read also: Panic in the Kremlin. Why does Putin need volunteer battalions?
I believe, though, that it is most likely that Ukraine will win this war, on the basis of seven underlying factors that tend to decide the form of armed conflicts: time, economics, logistics, landscape, mode of combat, ethos, and strategy (the TELLMES). In the case of this war, we also have to consider the wild card of international public opinion.
In discussing each one of the TELLMES, I will also clarify how matters might turn a different way than I expect, making a Russian victory more likely. Then you can make up your own minds about my judgement. My thinking about all this comes from a couple of sources: my reading of military history over the decades, and my attention to the Russian and Ukrainian sources that I follow on this war. Readers might want to compare what I say with the conclusions of proper military historians — Lawrence Freedman would be a good start.
Time. Russia was banking on a quick victory. When the quick victory is not produced, and the enemy is not humiliated, then time asserts itself, and other unforeseen factors come into play. The longer a war goes on, the more the advantages that a larger power has (or seems to have) will dissipate.
Economics. Russia is a far larger economy than Ukraine. The sanctions on Russia, in my judgement at least, will begin to matter soon, as the Ukrainian army begins to exhibit a technological superiority that Russia cannot match without (sanctioned) imports.
Russia has done much to destroy the Ukrainian economy. But Ukraine is supported by western economic power, which dwarfs both economies together. In the Second World War, not just the British but also the Soviets depended upon the American…
Read More: The state of the Russo-Ukrainian war. TELLMES tell us that Russia is losing