The U.S. Navy must reconsider the strategic uses of naval mines, its “least spectacular and most effective weapons.” Naval forces took a backseat to ground and air forces in the Middle East wars, but sea control has been the cornerstone of military success among great powers since the dawn of civilization. Command of the sea has two basic requirements: the ability of one’s own forces to move and act freely and the ability to deny free movement and action to the enemy.
As the U.S. military reorients toward the sea, old assets must be updated to meet the demands of an evolving future and ensure command of the sea. The platforms the Navy uses to conduct mine warfare, including the Avenger-class mine countermeasures ships, must be overhauled to prepare the United States for 21st century mine warfare. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), P-8 Poseidon aircraft, and a reinvigorated sense of purpose are all key ingredients to modern naval mine warfare supremacy.
U.S. Mining History
Mines are versatile weapons because they can be used defensively and offensively in a variety of situations. The United States has deployed mines for generations, from the crude “keg” torpedoes of the American Revolution to the secret mining of Nicaraguan ports during the Iran-Contra Affair. But modern technology has unlocked new promises for mines beyond mere explosiveness. The modern mine is less like a roadside improvised explosive device and more like a patient underwater robot able to gather and disseminate information, discriminate between friend and foe, and finally unleash efficient violence on an enemy ship.
Mines are essential to sea control. More than almost any other instrument in the Navy’s arsenal, they can deny freedom of movement by forcing enemies to channel themselves into mine-free areas or deterring their movement altogether. Mines can turn a segment of ocean into a maritime Thermopylae by funneling the enemy into a strategic area that advantages the minelayer.
Mines introduce friction, one of Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz’s more famous neologisms. “Activity in war is movement in a resistant medium. Just as a man in water is unable to perform with ease and regularity the most natural and simplest movement, that of walking, so in war, with ordinary powers, one cannot keep even the line of mediocrity,” wrote Clausewitz. Since the beginning of mine warfare, mines have been a tool to increase the friction an enemy faces.
Additionally, mines do not need to be very sophisticated to cause lethal damage. As captured in a 2016 Proceedings article,
During the 1980s “tanker war,” the USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58) struck a contact mine of World War I design, resulting in damage exceeding $96 million. On one day in February 1991, Iraqi-laid mines inflicted serious damage on two U.S. Navy warships. The billion-dollar Aegis cruiser USS Princeton (CG-59) suffered $5 million in damage in the shape of a 23-foot hole in her hull after she struck a World War I-technology-based contact mine.
Since 1945, four times as many U.S. ships have been damaged by mines as by any other anti-ship measure.
If an enemy ship knows where a minefield is, it will have to avoid or disarm it. This can delay or thwart the enemy’s operations. The United States learned this lesson during the Korean War as it attempted to clear the minefield at Wonsan to disastrous effect. Over the course of 15 days, three vessels were lost and more than 200 sailors wounded or killed in the naval campaign. Moreover, mines can delay or deflect the transport of fuel, personnel, and materiel that travel overseas. Thus, mine countermeasures (MCM) must be the first wave of an offensive sortie because a large sealift operation is too risky without the escort of MCM forces.
Finally, mines disrupt nonmilitary affairs such as commercial trade, commercial travel, and industries like fishing and drilling. Operation…
Read More: Don’t Undermine the Navy | Proceedings